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

THE FIASCO OF THE UNITED NATIONS

by Felix Morley

Japan capitulated and World War II ended on August 14, 1945. Just two years later the outstanding fact in the international picture is the almost complete stalemate in the United Nations, organization of which was a primary objective of our policy in entering the last war.

To those who took the trouble to explore the subject honestly it has been apparent, at least since the preliminary conference at Dumbarton Oaks, that the United Nations had much less promise than the old League of Nations. For some months there was concerted and partially successful efforts to smear anyone who even ventured to point out why the inferior organization was doomed to frustration. HUMAN EVENTS did not succumb to this senseless intimidation.

On August 23, 1944, as the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the United States, Great Britain and Russia convened, we warned against the Russian plan whereby "any one of the three would have the right to veto a proposal for joint action against aggression in case that aggression were sponsored by one of the three contracting Powers itself."

On October 18, 1944, in reviewing the work of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, we summarized the reasons for thinking that the Charter developed there "is much less promising, as an instrument of international government, than is the Covenant of the League of Nations." Under the latter, we pointed out, it was possible in 1939 to expel Russia from the League for its unprovoked aggression against Finland. "No such condemnation of any specially favored Power would be allowed under the Charter drafted at Dumbarton Oaks."

On May 16, 1945, while the San Francisco Conference was sitting, we emphasized again that the theory of the United Nations is "a repressive and domineering Triple Alliance, of Russia, Great Britain and the United States, rather than any international organization worthy of the name." This system, we then pointed out, could endure no longer than its underlying military alliance, which with the German collapse was already "in liquidation."

On July 4, 1945, when the completed San Francisco Charter was before the Senate for ratification, we concluded from careful analysis

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that this document must be defined as "a constitutional monstrosity" and urged "a reservation to permit the United States to withdraw amicably from the United Nations" in the event of its failure.

These common-sense observations, contemporaneously denounced as "obstructionist," are not cited now for any vainglorious purpose. They are recalled merely because they help to clarify the extremely difficult diplomatic position of the United States today. It would add to these diplomatic difficulties if Americans should overlook them merely because the Kremlin momentarily plays ball with UN in order to weaken the colonial prestige and economic strength of The Netherlands.

II

The Soviet Government, of course, joined UN for the single purpose of insuring that it would be futile. This regime has its own international organization already firmly established from Hungary in the West to Outer Mongolia in the East. But the growth of the Communist International would have been seriously impeded by a revived League of Nations strengthened by American membership and competent to check the insidious aggression by which Russia is constantly expanding its own league. Therefore the able rulers in the Kremlin seized their opportunity to join us in destroying the Geneva organization, supplanting it with one which they could control at will. In every detail the personal diplomacy of President Roosevelt played into Russian hands.

The key to Russian strategy was the veto power, enabling Moscow to commit aggression directly or through her satellites while using her privileged position on the "Security Council" to prevent aggression from being defined as such. This, from Stalin's viewpoint, was the great advance over the old League. That organization, while it lacked power to restrain an aggressor, was at least able to bring an effective indictment. It did so successively in the case of Japan, Italy, Germany and Russia. After the expulsion of the latter, in December, 1939, it was therefore necessary to Communist planning to dissolve the more democratic League and set up one which Russia could control. Into this trap Mr. Roosevelt fell headlong.

It is not merely wisdom in retrospect to say that the obvious course for the United States was to reconstitute the Geneva organization. Having failed to become a Member ourselves we were in a perfect position to say to Russia, in effect, "let us eat crow together. You were expelled by Geneva, perhaps too hastily, and we never had the sense to join. But after all Geneva showed its ability to define aggression and with our joint power behind it the organization would have real

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promise of achieving a peaceful world. In this and that respect, of course, we should improve the Covenant." That would have been easy.

Such a suggestion would have provided the acid test of Communist sincerity and would have put Stalin on the spot, where we are ourselves today. Very likely the firm objective of world revolution would have forced the Kremlin to refuse any invitation to join an organization where it had no power to block a definition of Russia as an aggressor. But, at worst, we should then have known where we stood. The last two years would not have been spent in steadily strengthening Communism.

III

It is now generally realized that Russia has exercised the veto power eleven times -- an average of once every seven weeks -- during the 18 months the Security Council has been in full operation. And the consequent disillusionment is leading to an uneasy feeling, apparent in many quarters, that "something should be done" about it. Suggestions that the United Nations should be reconstituted without Russia are frequent -- in other words that this great "peace-loving" Power, as we ourselves solemnly defined her, should again be expelled.

This idle talk unfortunately reveals how little the American people actually understand the bog in which Roosevelt's slapdash diplomacy has landed them; how little they appreciate the contrasting subtlety of Russian policy, and how ill-informed they are on the actual provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by us without a single "obstructionist" reservation.

There is not the least likelihood, on the one hand, that Russia will withdraw from the United Nations and it is certain, on the other hand, that Russia cannot be legally expelled.

Why anybody should expect Russia to resign is a mystery. It was asserted above that the Kremlin joined UN for the sole purpose of keeping it ineffective while Russia's own Communist world organization is developed. Of course only circumstantial evidence for this charge is at present available, but this alone is so strong as to be damning. The policy of blocking from within the Security Council is working beautifully, from Moscow's viewpoint. Why should it be abandoned?

As for expulsion, the skillful wording of the relevant article in the Charter speaks for itself. Article 6 says:

> "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

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The Security Council cannot make this recommendation for expulsion to the Assembly if Russia, as a permanent Member of the Council, opposes it. And if anybody thinks that Mr. Gromyko is going to hesitate to veto a motion to expel his own government, he is, to put it mildly, naive.

IV

It seems time for belated reflection on various other aspects of the mess into which we have blithely blundered. One of these is our successful insistence on establishing the seat of the United Nations in this country. Ardent committees of deluded citizens dashed hither and yon, upholding the rival claims of various American communities for this high honor. Now we have the Secretariat, well-salted with Communist employees who are all potential if not actual spies, firmly established with diplomatic immunities in our midst. But it was "isolationist" to observe the care with which Stalin did not invite the United Nations to place its headquarters behind the Iron Curtain.

Before long, as the tide is running, the question of dissolving the United Nations will come increasingly to the fore. That will happen because in no other way can Russia be removed from the organization which she now so skillfully dominates. The cancer is inoperable, so in time the patient will die.

In advance of dissolution, however, the most serious consideration should be given to reconstituting the old League of Nations, at its seat in Switzerland, a democracy which has had the wisdom never to apply for membership in UN, and has no intention of so doing.

This course, which could have been so easily followed three years ago, will be infinitely more difficult to accomplish now. But the difficulties will have to be faced eventually. Already the "Truman Doctrine" and the "Marshall plan" are in effect operating to dissolve the United Nations and to create a new grouping, frankly opposed to the flourishing Soviet league. It is only a matter of time until it is realized that this implies re-establishment of an international organization which was at least competent to define aggression.

In a single generation the United States has helplessly drifted into two world wars. Now, more rapidly than ever before, we are drifting towards a third -- an atomic war of Unconditional Surrender. On the second anniversary of V-J Day it is appropriate to ask whether we have the courage to take the first step towards salvation, which must always be the admission of past folly. If we really believe that UN is accomplishing anything to avert another war, why do we want conscription?

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events VOL. IV, NO. 33

By Frank C. Hanighen August 13, 1947

Some call it "schizophrenia in the White House." There are persistent reports that President Truman is considering Secretary of Agriculture Clinton P. Anderson as the successor of Bob Hannegan in the post of Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. (Hannegan, it is believed, will have to retire because of ill health.) Now Anderson is a conservative Democrat and his appointment to this position would certainly lead to the conclusion that Truman was reversing his recent Left Wing policy. It is not exactly clear how the conservative Anderson could accept the present White House strategy of playing ball with the CIO. Maybe Truman has thought this through, maybe not. At any rate, there is justification for the view that the titular leader of the Democratic Party exhibits a "divided personality," and indecision as to which course he should pursue in the developing campaign for re-election.

Some Democratic politicos say that they don't care which way he decides to play it, whether Right or Left, so long as he plays it. They are greatly disturbed at what they say is almost complete lack of preparation and planning for the 1948 campaign. This stands in marked contrast with the situation which used to prevail under Roosevelt when a Presidential campaign was approaching. For instance, in June, 1935, a "council of war," comprising the principal political leaders was held in the White House to ready matters for the campaign of the following year. As early as that, Farley and Roosevelt had conferences several times a week, on the problems of patronage and "fence-mending." Today, Truman rarely sees Gael Sullivan (who has been pinch-hitting during the illness of Hannegan) and does not place much confidence either in Sullivan or Hannegan. And no preparations or planning of any definite or important nature are under way.

It is pointed out that neither Truman nor his White House aides are experienced in such matters. The President never ran a national campaign; Matt Connally and Charley Ross, his principal secretaries, have had no such experience. If they had, say observers, they would never let the President "waste time" visiting South America this summer. Roosevelt, it is recalled, only made a South American trip after the 1936 election. Truman, say the Democratic sages, should devote his time this sumer to touring the country on "inspection" trips a la Roosevelt. He is not well enough known to the electorate and the "folksy" personal contacts he would make on such journeys would show him at his best and win friends.

*The Party needs friends, lots of them. If Mr. Anderson takes over the direc*tion of the National Democratic Committee, he will find the Party machine in bad condition, suffering from loss of local power in various urban areas, civil war between conservatives and Left Wingers in many places, etc. He will doubtless look for the enormous mailing list which Mr. Farley compiled during his regime and put on addressograph stencils; it included thousands of names not only of Democratic local leaders but innumerable "friends of the Party" who could be counted on -- all over the country. Mr. Anderson would then find that Mr. Hannegan's subordinates had destroyed this invaluable list. One year will not be enough to repair the loss, to cement the multitude of personal contacts necessary in "getting out the vote" and winning an election.

* * * * *

The light that failed in the abortive Senate Committee investigation last week was not the spotlight on the affairs of Howard Hughes and Elliott Roosevelt, nor even the brief, perhaps blinding, flash on the PanAm-TWA conflict. The light that failed was the examination of how lobbies work on the Executive, rather than the Legislative, arm of the Government -- a probe long anticipated.

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Out in the country, there is a delusion that a lobbyist is a man whose sole business is to seduce Members of Congress. "Influencing legislation" on Capitol Hill indeed constitutes quite a sizable business, as the registered expenses, required by the Congressional Reorganization Act, have shown. But practicing brethren in the Capital make no secret of the fact that as much (if not more) of their business is concerned with the Executive as with the Legislature. This has become so, particularly in recent years, with the growth of the bureaucracy. The administration of a law is often more important to the citizen than its wording.

The last Congress (the Seventy-Ninth) washed its own dirty linen in public in the May-Garsson case. It had been expected that the present body would profitably delve into what the Executive had been doing with special interests. The Brewster-Ferguson committee failed dismally both in the manner of its preparatory investigation and in the method of its hearings. But few in this skeptical city will therefore conclude that further investigation of the Executive is unnecessary.

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Deputy American delegate (to the UN) Herschel Johnson was not talking idly when he warned that Western countries might try to use the UN Assembly for the purpose of preventing Communist aggression in Greece. As a matter of fact, the General Staff of the U. S. Army has privately proposed that the creation of an international military force to send to Greece should be authorized by the UN Assembly, since the Russians would veto any such move in the Security Council. The State Department is reportedly considering the proposal very seriously. The following countries, it is suggested, might be persuaded to send contingents: Turkey, South Africa, Australia, Canada, an Arab state, Brazil and -- believe it or not! -- Argentina. The matter may be discussed with the two latter States this week at Rio de Janeiro. Whether or not this plan is adopted, the fact that it is seriously discussed shows to what extremities our planners are driven by the failure of UN. (See Analysis this week.)

* * * * *

The British Government, some say, "is more planned against than planning." What they mean is that the "Marshall plan" would make Britain just one of the European queue rather than a preferred recipient of American international assistance. Hence, Anglo-American talks which the British hope will result in relaxation of some provisions of the 1946 loan. And hence, suspicious observers believe, an alleged British "bargaining plan" to undermine Washington's stern attitude.

This "plan," if such it is, runs as follows. Attlee and Dalton announced cuts in imports of certain products last week. It is claimed that they carefully selected the products (most of which come from the United States) so as to obtain the maximum supposed reaction among American producers. (1) Wheat cuts were expected to arouse farmers in particular, but business in general as well, for it is still feared that a recession would start again (as it did in 1920) from the collapse of agriculture. (2) Cuts in tobacco imports would hit planters in the heart of the Administration's political power, the South. (3) The 75 per cent tax on American film revenues from the British market would affect California, an important state. Also, the potent Motion Picture Producers Association enjoys no little influence in the White House. (4) There is only a small cut on gasoline, of which American producers have no surplus for export.

Planned that way or not, the British measures have caused little commotion so far. Farm leaders seem quite unworried, some saying, "wish they would cut more" and "we can't fill the needs as it is." No visible uproar has come from the tobacco industry. The movie industry slapped an embargo on films to Britain, then sat back

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to hear the cries of alarm from British exhibitors who depend on America for 80 per cent of their wares. Government economists welcome some easing of exports, because of the high prices. In any case, when the British and American representatives sit down together there will be a variegated lot of chips in the poker game.

* * * * *

Thoughtful Europeans do not accept the Truman doctrine as the answer to all questions in the realm of foreign policy. Mr. Robert Speaight, writing in the London weekly Time and Tide (July 26) gently but insistently poses a challenge to the official American policy: "If I am to choose, I choose the Truman doctrine. But I do not think my choice gets me very far. . . .

"The young American can swallow John Dewey's relativism lock, stock and barrel, and yet believe that man has an 'inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' The Young European would not, perhaps, as a rule, deny the American proposition, but he would ask rather carefully what the words meant, and he would arrive at some surprising conclusions. And when Mr. Truman seeks to make their meaning clear, he does not always get the point. . . . At some point or other the sovereign word -- progress -- will complacently resound. It is inescapable, and it makes everyone feel better. . . . And it awakens in Europe a rude and recognizable echo . . . as the cry goes up from London, Paris, Vienna, Rome, Athens and the other cities of the Plain -- 'So what?' . . . we have the right to inquire whether the pursuit of happiness in Arizona has not halted the same pursuit in Hiroshima. We may be relieved that this troublesome baby is in American hands, and yet ask ourselves whether this was not a case for abortion.

"We are all agreed, from Moscow to Minnesota, that the chief enemy of happiness is fear and we may well wonder if the birth of a universal terror does credit to the development of scientific techniques. We may well lay our cards on the table and declare that happiness as we understand it and progress as they understand it may on occasion be incompatible. That is why I say that even if I choose the Truman doctrine, the choice does not get me very far. The question which is loud in the European heart, and secretly insistent in the American, demands a more radical reply."

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We have mentioned previously the adverse treatment accorded George Morgenstern's Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War in the book reviews. Mr. John H. Sachs has given the title, Hatchet Men (Lincoln Way Booklets, New Oxford, Pa.) to his reflections on this subject: "This booklet is not intended as a defense of Morgenstern's work, although it may seem to be. He put down hundreds of facts and cited authority for his facts. From these, he drew certain conclusions . . . Thus his book is an objective book, most amply documented, and based primarily upon the testimony of witnesses appearing before the Congressional committee investigating the disaster of Pearl Harbor. Rational and forthright methods in criticizing a work of this character would require: first, a rebuttal of Morgenstern's facts; second, an unearthing of contrary facts; and third, a deduction of other conclusions from the revised set of facts.

"Did any of the three critics named in this booklet adopt such methods? Not one used anything approaching them. That is why they, as individuals, are cited as examples of Hatchet Men. That is why their offerings are critically examined."

The critics whom Mr. Sachs selects for examination are all writers for prominent publications. Sachs shows how they avoided battle with Morgenstern on the basis of the facts the latter cited. One of the critics actually distorted -- as Mr. Sachs explains -- statements in the book and "his whole outburst against Morgenstern revolves about, and is held to, these distortions." The others took refuge, one in peevish denunciation, the other in geopolitical talk.

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Book Events

Report on the Germans, by William L. White. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. $3.00

Since the end of the war there has been a more or less standardized technique for reporting on the Germans. The main idea was to get them coming and going. If they were friendly and co-operative they were brushed off as servile and designing. If they suggested that not all the atrocities of the war (and the peace) had been on one side, they were set down as unregenerate Nazis. Above all they were found lacking in "repentance." If, for instance, a German whose house had been destroyed in an incendiary raid, in which some members of his family perished, whose sons had vanished in Russian captivity, failed to beat his breast and assume personal responsibility for the war, this was interpreted as a sad lack of the moral sense.

William L. White, one of the most intelligent, human and readable of our popular global correspondents, has adopted a different method, with refreshingly realistic results. He has let the Germans whom he met during a trip to that country last summer speak for themselves. Out of the stories, some longer, some shorter, of some dozen German men and women one gets a broad picture of Germany in war and in the state of ruin and collapse which it would be ironical to call peace.

And, as the author himself suggests, the composite impression which emerges is not black or white, but gray. Excluding the minority of Nazi Party fanatics, adventurers and sadists, most Germans displayed the same mixture of good and bad qualities, of strength and weakness that might have been expected from any group of human beings. This is also the testimony of a Jewish woman who survived the war in Berlin, living under false papers, and who described how some Germans, including a doctor with a Nazi Party card, helped her to evade detection, while a woman who owed her some money tried to betray her.

One obtains in these warmly written pages glimpses of the queer, perverted social relations that have developed in an atmosphere of hunger and squalor under an oppressive and contradictory Four Power occupation. The Germans found a word for the many girls who gave themselves to American soldiers, white and black, for the sake of food and comforts, and even of cheerful companionship, since the comparatively few German young men were usually tense and gloomy. They called them "Ruinenmauschen," literally "ruins mice," of which there are so many in the rubble and wreckage of the German cities.

Under occupation etiquette an American could not invite a German, even if he or she were a survivor of the July 20 plot against Hitler, to a meal in an American mess. By way of compensation German dogs, the property of Americans, could be fed from the leftovers of these messes.

As a very young man the author saw the occupation of Germany after World War I. In retrospect he finds it much more human, decent and civilized than what followed World War II, and tells some distinctly discreditable stories of American looting, brutality and poor discipline.

What one misses in the book is a roundup of the big problems of post-war Germany: the terrific influx of refugees into a bomb-wrecked and half-starved country, the economic impossibilities of the Potsdam Agreement, the currency chaos, the excesses of de-Nazification. One gets glimpses, but only brief glimpses, of the mistakes the correction of which is now causing headaches in Washington, Frankfurt and Berlin.

However, Mr. White makes it very clear that, in his opinion, it lies largely in our hands to promote or prevent a revival of the Hitler cult some ten or fifteen years hence. The way to promote it is to let the Germans stagnate in misery, hunger and despair. The way to prevent it is to assist by all means the emergence of a free and democratic Germany. -- William Henry Chamberlin

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